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ABSTRACT
Cache-based side-channel attacks have garnered much interest in recent liter-
ature. Such attacks are particularly relevant for cloud computing platforms
due to high levels of multi-tenancy. In fact, there exists recent work that
demonstrates such attacks on real cloud platforms (e.g., DotCloud). In this
thesis we present Cauldron, a framework to defend against such cache-based
side-channel attacks. Cauldron uses a combination of smart scheduling tech-
niques and microarchitectural mechanisms to achieve this goal. We are able
to demonstrate improved defenses against both cross-core side channel at-
tacks that target shared caches as well as same-core attacks. Furthermore,
Cauldron is transparent to the user – requiring no modification (or even re-
compilation) of users’ application binaries by integrating directly with the
popular container runtime framework, Docker. Preliminary evaluation re-
sults show that the proposed approach is effective for cloud computing ap-
plications.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has rapidly gained adoption over the last few years as or-
ganizations have tried to reduce the complexities and costs associated with
deploying and maintaining a reliable computing infrastructure. It is equally
popular with small companies and start-ups that have relatively fewer re-
sources as with large organizations including the US federal government. In
fact, the federal government has instituted a CloudFirst policy and expects
to spend about a quarter of its $80 billion IT budget on cloud computing ser-
vices [21]. Furthermore, a report by the Carbon Disclosure Project on cloud
computing shows that large US companies (those with more than $1 billion
in revenues) are set to increase their adoption of cloud computing from 10%
to 70% of their IT spending over the next decade and realize a savings of
$12.3 billion in energy costs alone. On the other hand, many cloud service
companies have developed a “multi-tenant” policy where jobs from different
clients can be simultaneously, yet transparently (to each other), executed to
better utilize the underlying hardware resources.
While Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds enabled by hardware virtu-
alization have been dominant, Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings enabled
by operating system (OS) level virtualization techniques are fast emerging
as a lightweight and high-performance alternative [23, 25]. OS virtualiza-
tion technology, hereafter generically referred to as Containers1, provides a
lightweight execution environment with better performance and less overhead
than VMs [56, 29].
This rapid adoption and the multi-tenant nature of cloud computing pro-
vide a greater incentive for attackers to target such systems. Recently, cache-
based side-channel attacks have received much attention. It has been shown
1Note that user-space instances in a virtualized OS are refereed to as Containers in
many technologies, other names such as virtual engines, virtual private servers and jails
are also in use.
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that such attacks are capable of extracting fine-grained information such as
cryptographic keys even in the cloud environment [43, 35, 57, 59]. Some of
the attacks have also been demonstrated on public cloud infrastructures [60].
In fact, with the adoption of lightweight virtualization methods such as Linux
containers [25, 23, 18] such attacks can become easier.
In this thesis, we present the Cauldron framework to defend against cache-
based side-channel attacks in cloud environments based on the aforemen-
tioned lightweight virtualization, viz.,containers.
Cauldron is:
i) easy to deploy,
ii) transparent to end users and
iii) provides increased security against such attacks.
The framework uses a novel combination of hardware and software mech-
anisms to achieve these goals. Specifically, Cauldron does not require devel-
opers to modify their applications or libraries. This makes the application
development process much easier and it can also be used for legacy applica-
tions. In this thesis, we also demonstrate how to integrate our framework
into the Docker [23] container runtime. The solutions proposed in this thesis
are not specific to Docker and are generally applicable to other OS virtualiza-
tion frameworks (container runtimes) such as rkt and LXC [18, 25]. In fact,
they can be applied to cloud environments employing hardware virtualization
technologies such as Xen and KVM [27, 10].
Previous approaches were either limited to defending against same-core at-
tacks [61, 52], limited by the performance of software-based cache-partitioning
[39, 49, 31] or required modifications to applications [39, 42] (refer to Chapter
3 for more details). In contrast, Cauldron defends against both same-core
and cross-core attacks, doesn’t require changes to end-user applications or
libraries, and is easy to deploy while incurring only reasonable overheads.
1.1 Contributions
We design and implement Cauldron, a framework to defend against cache-
based side-channel attacks in the cloud environment. In our security evalua-
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tion, in Chapter 5, we show that it is able to protect against both same-core
and cross-core cache-based side-channel attacks. By implementing Cauldron
as a loadable kernel module we are able to develop an easy to deploy so-
lution. Furthermore, we design our framework to ensure that it does not
require any changes to be made to user applications, containers or libraries
and integrates cleanly with a popular container runtime, Docker. Finally, we
show that Cauldron is able to achieve all of the aforementioned advantages
using commodity off-the-shelf hardware, while incurring only a reasonable
overhead.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: in Chapter 2 we pro-
vide a background on containers, the Intel cache architecture along with an
introduction to cache-based side-channel attacks. Related work is discussed
in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we present our system and attack models along
with the Cauldron implementation. We evaluate the Cauldron framework
in Chapter 5. A discussion on the advantages, limitations and future work
is covered in Chapter 6 and we conclude in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Although virtualization technologies attempt to stop any leakage of informa-
tion across clients sharing the same underlying hardware, prior work, such
as [59, 60, 43, 35] has shown that these virtualization technologies are suscep-
tible to cache-based side-channel attacks. In order to fully understand such
attacks, in this chapter, we provide a background of virtualization technolo-
gies, with a focus on containers, the Intel cache architecture and cache-based
side-channel attacks.
2.1 Virtualization Technologies
Today’s Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) clouds are powered by hardware
virtualization while, on the hand, Platform as a Service (PaaS) offerings
are increasingly adopting containers for tenant isolation. We discuss both
virtualization technologies in detail below.
2.1.1 Hardware Virtualization
In IaaS clouds, such as Amazon EC2 [1], Google Compute Engine [8] and
Azure Virtual Machines [3], clients can spin up virtual machines (VMs) that
attempt to emulate physical machines. As shown in the Figure 2.1a, each VM
has its own operating system along with libraries and application binaries.
Multiple VMs run on top of a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) which in
turn runs on physical hardware. The VMM is responsible for multiplexing
hardware resources, such as CPU and memory, between the client VMs that
it hosts. Popular VMM implementations include Xen and KVM [27, 10].
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(a) Hardware virtualization
stack
(b) OS virtualization stack
Figure 2.1: Comparison between the hardware and OS virtualization stacks
2.1.2 Containers
While hardware virtualization remains popular, public PaaS offerings are
increasingly being powered by container runtimes [60]. In such PaaS offerings
client jobs are run inside containers, as opposed to VMs. Containers can be
seen as light-weight VMs. As shown in Figure 2.1b, unlike VMs, containers
do not have their own OS and instead all containers running on the same
underlying host, i.e., co-located containers, share the host OS. Furthermore,
where appropriate, libraries are also shared between co-located containers to
increase memory efficiency.
The increase in popularity of containers can be attributed to their light-
weight nature because of which, the time to start a container is on the order
of milliseconds in contrast to VMs which can take several seconds to launch.
Similarly, containers also incur a lower performance overhead when compared
to VMs [56, 29]. Powerful container runtimes, such as Docker [23] and rkt [18]
have made containers easy to manage, build and deploy. While, container
registries, like Docker Hub [7] and Quay [16], have made containers easy to
share, further increasing adoption.
In order to virtualize the OS, a container runtime needs to be able to allo-
cate resources to containers and be able to isolate the view of the system from
within containers. To achieve these two goals, container runtimes leverage
Linux kernel functionality, namely, control groups (cgroups) [38] and kernel
namespaces [14] to build containers. Cgroups provide a resource manage-
ment solution while namespaces enable resource isolation. To provide added
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security, a number of container runtimes support mandatory access control
policies by either integrating with Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [19]
or AppArmor [2].
We discuss cgroups and namespaces in greater detail below.
Linux Control Groups (cgroups)
Cgroups enable fine-grained resource management of user-defined groups of
processes [38]. Cgroups present a powerful abstraction for system adminis-
trators by allowing them to limit the amount of system resources, such as
memory and disk I/O, available to different user-defined groups of processes.
Cgroups were merged into the Linux kernel mainline with the kernel version
2.6.24 in early 2008 [6].
Cgroups can be created, deleted and updated using the cgroup virtual
filesystem. Each cgroup has an associated task set that includes the pro-
cesses that are part of the cgroup and on which the cgroup resource allo-
cations apply. Cgroups are arranged hierarchically, where a child cgroup
inherits properties from its parent cgroup. Take for example, a cgroup that
is assigned a 40% share in CPU time and has two child cgroups both of
which are assigned equal shares of CPU time. In such a scenario, the child
cgroups will each be allocated 20% of the actual CPU time. There can exist
multiple cgroup hierarchies in system, where each hierarchy is assigned to a
different system resource [17]. For instance, separate cgroup hierarchies can
be maintained for memory and CPU time. Note that, processes not assigned
to any cgroup are added to the root cgroup.
As mentioned earlier, to manage resource allocation, container runtimes
leverage cgroups. A separate cgroup is created for each container. All pro-
cesses running inside a container are added to the task set of its associated
cgroup. Generally, four system resources, CPU, memory, disk I/O and the
network are managed using cgroups. The memory cgroup tracks and lim-
its the memory pages being used by a cgroup. Weights are assigned to each
cgroup in the CPU subsystem hierarchy to determine the ratio in which CPU
time will be divided between cgroups. The disk I/O cgroup subsystem can
be used to track and throttle I/O operations performed by cgroups. Finally,
the network cgroup enables the assignment of traffic generated by a cgroup
to different traffic priority classes.
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Namespaces
Namespaces isolate the view of processes within a namespace of a certain
global resource [14]. Any updates made to the global resource by a process
are only visible to other processes within the same namespace but remain
invisible to processes outside of the namespace [11]. PID, Mount, IPC, User,
UTS and Network namespaces are supported by the Linux kernel.
All six of the supported namespaces are utilized to create an isolated view
of the system for each container. By creating a separate PID namespace
for each container, processes within a container are limited to viewing other
processes belonging to the same container. An isolated view of the filesys-
tem hierarchy is created using the Mount namespace. The UTS namespace
is used to create a separate hostname identifier for each container. Separate
interprocess communication resources, such as IPC semaphores and message
queues are created using the IPC namespaces. By leveraging the Network
namespaces a separate network stack is created for every container. This in-
cludes separate routing tables, IP table rules and network interfaces. Finally,
User namespaces are utilized to allow different mappings of a process’s user
ID inside and outside of a container [20].
2.2 Cache Architecture
There can be many types of caches present in a given system, such as CPU,
application and database caches. In this thesis we only concern ourselves
with CPU caches and we hereafter refer to CPU caches as simply, caches.
Since caches are central to the attacks and defenses discussed in this thesis,
we provide an introduction to them here.
For data to be processed, it needs to brought into the processor. Processors
are capable of processing data much faster than it can be read from main
memory. This makes input to the processor the bottleneck [13]. This forms
the motivation for caches, which are a small, high-speed memory that stores
recently accessed data from main memory. Their goal is to reduce the time for
the processor to access memory. In order to be effective, caches exploit spatial
locality i.e., if a memory location is accessed, memory locations around that
location are likely to be accessed in the near future. Keeping this is mind,
each entry in the cache is 64 (or 32) bytes and is referred to as a cache line.
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Caches fetch complete cache lines from memory instead of single memory
locations.
As compared to main memory, caches are much smaller in size. This is
because caches are more expensive to build. Since caches are smaller than
the main memory, a mapping from lines in main memory to locations in the
cache is required. One approach is to allow any line in memory to map to
any location in the cache. Such an approach requires that when searching
for the presence of a memory address in the cache, the complete cache needs
to be checked. The approach is made infeasible by the need for a very large
number of comparators in its implementation [13]. Caches implementing
this approach are referred to as fully-associative caches. At the other end of
the spectrum are directly-mapped caches where each line in memory maps
to exactly one location in the cache. Although, this approach is easier to
implement, the in-flexibility in mapping significantly hampers performance.
Set-associative caches lie somewhere in between fully-associative and directly
mapped caches.
The set-associative approach, divides the cache into equally sized sections,
referred to as ways. The number of ways supported in the cache is referred
to as the cache-associativity. A line in memory maps to exactly one location
in each of the cache ways and together those locations are referred to as a
cache set. For instance, in a 4-way set-associative cache, each line in memory
maps to four locations in the cache, one in each cache way. By allowing a
more flexible mapping scheme, set-associative caches are able to outperform
directly mapped caches. In particular, they reduce conflict misses i.e., cache
misses that occur when there are empty spaces in the cache, just not in the
required cache set. As compared to fully-associative caches, set-associative
caches are cheaper to implement.
Due to the advantages discussed above, caches in modern Intel proces-
sors are set-associative. In the following subsections we discuss the cache
hierarchy and support for cache partitioning.
2.2.1 Cache Hierarchy
As shown in Figure 2.2, today’s multi-core processors typically have a multi-
level cache hierarchy with a shared last-level cache and private lowest-level
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Figure 2.2: Cache Hierarchy Overview
and intermediate-level caches. In this thesis, we limit ourselves to modern
Intel architectures that have a three level hierarchy [24]. The first level cache,
L1, is core-private i.e., each core has a separate L1 cache. Furthermore, the
L1 cache is divided into two parts, the L1 instruction cache and the L1 data
cache. The instruction cache is responsible for caching program instructions
while data is stored in the data cache. Similar to the L1 cache, the second
layer, L2 cache is also core-private but unlike the L1 cache, the L2 cache is
integrated, meaning both the instructions and the data share the same cache.
Finally, the L3 or last level cache (LLC) is shared among all the cores. The
L3 cache is integrated as well as inclusive, meaning all the cache lines present
in the lower level caches, L1 and L2, are also present in the L3 cache. As we
move from the L1 to the L3 cache, the size of the cache increases but at the
same time access latency increases as well.
In the remainder of this thesis we assume this 3 level cache architecture.
However, the proposed defense is generically applicable.
2.2.2 Intel Cache Allocation Technology
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, modern Intel cache architectures consist of a
shared L3 cache. The sharing of the L3 cache between all the cores in a
processor means that a misbehaving thread i.e., a thread that continuously
brings new data into the L3 cache but does not reuse any data brought into
the cache, can negatively impact the performance of other threads running
on the system along with the cache efficiency. Other threads are negatively
impacted because the misbehaving thread, continuously evicts the data they
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brought into the cache.
Considering cases similar to one discussed above, Intel introduced the
Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) which allows the partitioning of the
L3 cache between different cores on a processor. Partitions are assigned on a
per-core basis and threads are limited to evicting cache lines from the parti-
tion allocated to the core that they run on. By assigning a separate partition
to a misbehaving thread, the negative impacts on both, other threads in the
system and cache efficiency, can be mitigated.
Partitions are divided along cache ways. Classes of Service (COS) are
assigned ways of the L3 cache that they can allocate from. This assignment
is done using bit masks written to Model Specific Registers (MSRs). COS
can be allocated overlapping cache ways. Processor cores are then assigned
to COS that determine which cache ways are available to threads running
of the cores. No changes are required to the OS in order to benefit from
CAT. Intel requires that a minimum of 2 cache ways are assigned to a COS.
Importantly, CAT configuration can be changed dynamically by the MSRs
as described above.
On the latest Haswell architecture, the number of partitions is limited to
four [42]. Furthermore, since CAT has been developed with quality of service
(QoS) in mind, threads are able to get a hit for data present in different
partition of the L3 cache. Both these limitations impact Cauldron and we
discuss our solutions to them in Section 4.3.
2.3 Cache-based Side-Channel Attacks
A side-channel is an information leakage channel that can be used by the
attacker to gain insight into the victim application. An access-driven side-
channel attack consists of an attacker, co-located with the victim, that mon-
itors shared microarchitectural components, such as caches, to gain useful
information about the application the victim is running [59]. In this thesis
we focus on access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage caches, as they
have been shown to be able to extract fine-grained information from across
VM or container boundaries (e.g., [46, 50, 60, 59, 37, 32, 43, 35, 57]). The
attacks can be divided according to the cache level they target and the attack
technique they use. Some of the attacks target the L1 cache, while others
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take advantage of the shared L3 cache. We leave the details of such attacks to
Chapter 3. Instead, here we focus on the high-level attack techniques lever-
aged by cache-based side-channel attacks, namely, the Flush+Reload [57]
attack and the Prime+Probe [46] attack.
Following is a high-level description of these attacks techniques.
2.3.1 Flush+reload
The Flush+Reload attack leverages shared libraries with the victim to
launch a cache-based side-channel attack. Libraries are often shared in PaaS
clouds between co-located containers. Similarly, if the deduplication feature
is enabled in a VMM, libraries can be shared between VMs.
The attacker first identifies a code segment that she is interested in mon-
itoring in a library shared with the victim. The attacker then proceeds by
repeating the following three steps to launch the attack.
1) Flush: the attacker flushes the code segment from the cache,
2) Wait: then waits for a short period of time,
3) Reload: the attacker reloads the code segment, measuring access time.
In step 1, to flush the code segment, the attacker can use the “clflush”
instruction [5] available on x86 processors. The “clflush” instruction, flushes
the cache line passed to it as an argument from all levels of the cache hier-
archy. The attacker is only required to pass the virtual address of the code
segment as a parameter to the “clflush” instruction. The attacker then waits
a short period of time as specified in step 2 and then attempts to reload
the code segment in step 3. By measuring the time it takes the attacker to
reload the code segment, the attacker can determine if it was already present
in the cache or if it was loaded from memory. This determination is made
possible by the noticeable difference in memory and cache access times. On
the machine we use for our evaluation, Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2618L v3
@ 2.30GHz, we observe main memory access times to be around 300 CPU cy-
cles where as L3 access times are close to 100 CPU cycles. Since the attacker
flushed the code segment from the cache in step 1, if the attacker observes
an access time representative of a cache access in step 3, the attacker can
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conclude that the victim had loaded the code segment into the cache while
the attacker waited in step 2. On the other hand, an access time typical
of a memory access in step 3 means that the victim did not load the code
segment into the cache while the attacker waited.
2.3.2 Prime+Probe
Unlike the Flush+Reload attack, the Prime+Probe attack does not
rely on shared libraries. This places the additional burden on the attacker
to determine the target cache line of the victim. The attack follows repeated
iterations of a similar three step procedure to that described earlier.
1) Prime: the attacker loads its own data into the cache,
2) Wait: then waits for short period of time,
3) Probe: then reloads the data from step 1, measuring the access time.
In step 1, the attacker evicts all of the victim’s lines in the cache by loading
a cache-sized chunk of data. The attacker then waits for a short period of
time after loading the data. Then, in step 3 the attacks reloads the same
data it had previously loaded in step 1. By measuring the time it takes
to reload each of the lines, the attacker can determine which of the cache
sets were touched by the victim while the attacker waited in step 2. This is
because when a line is read by the victim, it would replace a line loaded by
the attacker.
After repeated iterations of the aforementioned steps, the attacker can
develop an access pattern for each of the cache sets. As an optimization, the
attacker can then limit itself to monitoring cache sets that have an access
pattern similar to what is expected from the target cache line of the victim.
The Prime+Probe attack can be implemented to target the L1 cache, in
which case the attacker and victim need to be running on the same core.
Furthermore, the attacker is then required to regularly preempt the victim
which can make the attack infeasible. The attack can also be implemented
to target the shared L3 cache, in which case, the attacker and victim can
be running on different cores of the processor and the attacker is no longer
required to preempt the victim.
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The Prime+Probe attack suffers from greater noise as compared to the
flush+reload attack. This is because, in the former, the attacker’s cache
line(s) can be evicted by any of the victim’s lines that map to the same cache
set. Therefore, there is no guarantee, when the attacker observes a higher
access time, that the victim actually accessed the target cache line. Such false
positives do not occur when launching the flush+reload attack where, by
leveraging shared libraries and the the “clflush” instruction, the attacker is
certain that a lower access time in the reload step, indicates that the target
cache line was accessed by the victim. An advantage of the Prime+Probe
attack is that it is more widely applicable as it does not rely on shared
binaries.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK
Side-channel and covert-channel attacks are well known in literature. In
this chapter, we limit our discussion to cache-based side-channel attacks and
defenses against them.
3.1 Cache-based Side-Channel Attacks
Many cache-based side-channel attacks ranging from coarse-grained to fine-
grained, from private lab setting to public cloud settings and from attacks
on VMs on a single core to cross-core have been discussed in literature (e.g.,
[46, 50, 60, 59, 37, 32, 43, 35, 57]). Prime+Probe and Flush+Reload
are common techniques used to launch such attacks. We discussed both of
these techniques in detail in Section 2.3.
Earlier attacks in the literature have focused on non-cloud environments.
Osvik et al. [46] were the first to introduce the Prime+Probe attack and
demonstrate its feasibility by launching an efficient side-channel attack across
process boundaries targeting AES. Percival [48] describes a similar attack on
RSA that leverages hyper-threading. Side-channel attacks in cloud environ-
ments have received much attention over the last few years (e.g., [50, 60, 59,
37, 32, 43, 35]). Zhang et al. [60] were the first to demonstrate a side-channel
attack capable of extracting fine-grained information across containers on a
public PaaS cloud. The attack used the Flush+Reload attack technique.
In addition, the authors were able to show that an attacker can achieve
co-location with a victim container on public PaaS offerings.
Prior to presenting side-channel attacks across containers, Zhang et al. [59]
again leverage cache-based side-channels but this time the attack is launched
across VMs. Although the attack is launched in a lab setting, the fact that
they were able to extract private across VM boundaries, highlights the sig-
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nificant risks posed by cache-based side-channels. They demonstrate the
attack on top of the Xen hypervisor. Their approach uses the core-private
L1 cache and therefore places the additional burden of frequent preempt-
ing of the victim VM on the attacker. The work serves as a follow-up of
Risentpart et al. [51] where the authors show how to achieve co-location
with a victim VM and build on the Prime+Probe technique to establish
coarse-grained cache-based side-channels across VMs on the public Amazon
EC2 cloud [1].
Similar to [59], a number of previous attacks had built timing channels
using the core-private L1 caches, this required the attacker to be able to
frequently preempt the victim VM. Varadarajan et al. [52] showed that such
attacks could be thwarted by making minor changes to the VMM scheduler.
On the other hand, attacks leveraging the Flush+Reload technique do
not require frequent preemption of the victim VM. Yarom et al. [57] and
Irazoqui et al. [36] demonstrate such attack with the victim and attacker
VMs running on different cores on top of the VMware ESX hypervisor. A
key limitation of such attacks is that they are dependent on memory dedu-
plication, a feature now disabled by default in all popular hypervisors (e.g.,
Xen, KVM, VMware ESX).
In an attempt to overcome the aforementioned limitations, recent work
by Fangfei et al. [43], Irazoqui et al. [35] introduced cross-core shared cache
side-channel attacks using the Prime+Probe attack technique. Both the
attacks leverage huge pages to be able to virtually address the complete LLC.
The attacks showed that cryptographic keys could be extracted across VMs
using the shared LLC without relying on the memory deduplication features.
3.2 Defenses Against Cache-based Side-Channel
Attacks
Many defenses against cache-based side-channels have also been proposed.
Varadarajan et al. [52] introduce a scheduler-based defense against cross-
VM side-channel attacks by incorporating a minimum run-time guarantee
(MRT) along with a per-core state-cleansing action. Once the MRT of VMs
is increased, the attacker is unable to preempt the victim VM frequently
enough so as to extract any fine-grained information. The work by Var-
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darajan et al. builds on the Du¨ppel system [61] where tenant VMs clear the
L1 cache to protect themselves against cache-based side-channels. However,
both of these methods do not address cross-core side-channel attacks.
Software-based cache-partitioning, viz., page-coloring [58], is used to iso-
late tenants in [39, 49, 31]. Raj et al. [49] evaluate the use of page coloring
and cache-aware core assignment (gang scheduling) albeit as independent
techniques. Godfrey et al. [31] employ software-based cache partitioning
together with cache flushing to defend against cache-based side-channel at-
tacks. However, most of these techniques are limited by the performance
of software-based cache partitioning. In addition, page-coloring based tech-
niques do not support huge pages [9], an important requirement for many
big-data cloud applications.
STEALTHMEM [39] overcomes the performance issue by allocating a se-
cure page to each core to protect small amounts of sensitive data belonging
to the VM running on the core. CATalyst [42] uses Intel’s CAT technol-
ogy in a similar manner. However, similar to STEALTHMEM, as CATalyst
provides a limited number of secure pages to each VM it consequently is
limited to protecting small amounts of sensitive data. More importantly,
both STEALTHMEM and CATalyst require modifications to applications as
sensitive variables need to be identified and annotated to avail the protec-
tion of secure pages. In contrast, we aim to provide isolation for the entire
container and our approach doesn’t require any changes to application code.
This makes it much easier for existing applications to use Cauldron.
As described in Section 2.3, cache-based side-channel attacks require accu-
rate timing information to differentiate between cache hits and misses. This
dependence on timing information has motivated a class of defenses that re-
duce the accuracy of timing information available to tenants. Vattikonda
et al. [53] along with the StopWatch [41] and TimeWarp [44] systems are all
implementations of this idea. By fuzzing the timing information available
to tenants they are able to successfully thwart cache-based side-channel at-
tacks. However, such approaches negatively affect legitimate uses of accurate
timing information.
Launching a successful cross-tenant, cache-based side-channel attack re-
quires attackers to co-locate with the victims. Approaches to defend against
co-location [26, 33, 28] are complementary to our efforts. New cache archi-
tectures to thwart cache-based side-channels [55, 54] face some deployment
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challenges as they require significant hardware support from chip manufac-
tures. In contrast, Cauldron requires only off-the-shelf commodity hardware.
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CHAPTER 4
APPROACH
4.1 System Model
We consider a public Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) or Infrastructure-as-a-
cloud (IaaS) cloud environment. Such a system allows the co-location of
containers belonging to different clients/organizations on the same physical
hardware. The mechanisms and ideas presented here are independent of
the actual container runtime framework but we base our implementation on
Docker [23]. Customers of the cloud framework need to specifically label
the subset of containers that require increased protection from attacks that
Cauldron enables (explained further below).
We also assume that the cloud computing infrastructure is built on com-
modity off-the-shelf (COTS) components that have multiple levels of caches,
some of which are shared. For instance, we carry out our experiments on
the Intel Haswell series of processors that have a three-level cache hierarchy:
private level 1 (L1) and level 2 (L2) caches for each core and a last level (L3)
cache that is shared among all the cores. This is the model of the system that
we use for the remainder of this thesis. However the proposed methodologies
are generally applicable as long as there exists a method to partition the
caches at runtime. For this purpose, we turn to the Intel Cache Allocation
Technology (CAT) [22, 24] that allows us to control the partitioning of the
shared L3 cache. The CAT mechanism is configured using model-specific
registers (MSRs). This can be carried out at runtime in a dynamic fashion
using software mechanisms. On the Haswell series of processors the maxi-
mum number of partitions is limited to four. We provide a more detailed
discussion on the Intel CAT in Section 2.2.2. Like in [40], we also assume
that hyper-threading is disabled on machines hosting secure containers.
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4.2 Attack Model
As mentioned earlier, we assume that containers from different sources (e.g.,
different organizations) can be co-located on the same underlying machine.
Hence, we assume that an adversary’s container(s) can execute, in parallel,
with those of the ‘victim’. This allows the attacker to launch side-channel
attacks using caches [59, 43, 35]. We consider both cross-core (i.e., attacker
and victim running on different cores on the same processor) and same-core
(i.e., attacker and victim running on the same core). In this thesis, we
specifically focus on Prime+Probe and Flush+Reload attacks, both of
which can be carried out in a public cloud computing infrastructure. We
discuss the attacks in detail in Section 2.3.
We assume that the cloud service providers are, in themselves, not mali-
cious since they have a vested interest in protecting their reputations. For
this thesis, we do not consider attacks that aim to compromise the cloud
computing infrastructure or the underlying operating system(s) – this will
be taken up as part of future work. Containers can also be compromised via
the communication network, e.g., due to a vulnerability in a (web) service
running in a container. These threats are not in the scope of this work as
they are present even while executing in private IT infrastructures owned by
the user. Furthermore, we assume that the list containing the subset of con-
tainers that require the higher resiliency/security is also trusted. Or rather,
a front-end mechanism that accepts the jobs in the first place includes a vet-
ting methodology that is separate from the actual physical hardware running
the containers.
4.3 Cauldron Design
The design goals for the Cauldron framework are as follows: (i) protect
containers from both same-core and cross-core cache-based side-channel at-
tacks; (ii) not require changes to user applications and libraries; (iii) be easy
to adopt and deploy and (iv) incur low performance overheads. Figure 4.1
presents a high-level overview of the framework.
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Figure 4.1: System design overview
4.3.1 Protection Model
In the Cauldron framework, clients/tenants are required to tag containers
that need extra care for security – i.e., the clients indicate which contain-
ers are carrying out critical operations or are dealing with sensitive data.
This, along with the information about container organizational ownership,
is the only additional input required from the user(s)1. If a tenant marks a
particular (subset set of) containers as requiring increased security then the
Cauldron framework will ensure that these containers are protected from
side-channel attacks – both, from all containers belonging to other organiza-
tions as well as well as the non-secure containers of the same tenant. In fact,
it is easy to extend Cauldron to support multi-level security (MLS) policies
such as Bell-LaPadula confidentiality policy. This will extend the utility of
this framework to private MLS cloud environments where the tenant contain-
ers all belong to the same organization but may have different security labels.
1We assume that the cloud service provider has a separate mechanism to verify whether
the containers that claim to be from a certain organization are actually so. This is an
orthogonal problem to the one being presented in this paper.
20
4.3.2 Protected Regions
Every host that is part of the Cauldron framework will have two regions –
a protected region and an unprotected region. We leverage the Intel Cache
Allocation Technology (CAT) [22, 24] to partition the host processor into
the above regions. CAT allows us to partition the shared L3 cache among
individual cores. Such partitions are created along cache ways; a minimum
partition size being 2 MB. CAT can be configured at runtime using model-
specific registers (MSRs). This allows us to add, remove or even scale parti-
tions as needed. Hence, each “region” (protected/unprotected) in Cauldron
is defined by: (a) a subset of processor cores and (b) a cache partition that is
private only to those cores. One such set (or maybe more than one depend-
ing on how the system is configured) is marked as the “protected region”.
Hence, containers that are marked as secure/sensitive will be run on the
protected core(s). CAT provides useful partitioning semantics and prevents
cross-core Prime+Probe attacks across partitions. In particular, attack-
ers cannot prime the L3 cache of the victim that is executing on a different
partition since CAT prevents evictions across partitions. However, a trivial
design entirely reliant on CAT will not prevent all side-channel attacks (e.g.,
same-core attacks). Also, Flush+Reload attacks will still succeed since
a process on one core can get hits from content loaded onto the cache from
another partition. Cauldron addresses all of these problems while still taking
advantage of the hardware-supported cache partitioning.
4.3.3 Cache Flushing
Even with hardware cache partitioning, L1 and L2 based side-channel at-
tacks can succeed when the attacker and the victim share the same core [59].
Hence, we use cache flushing mechanisms to prevent such attacks. We use a
software flushing mechanism (details in Section 4.4.3) but many processors
include hardware mechanisms. One way to implement the flush mechanism
would be invoke it within each container just before it relinquishes control.
This would require modifications to the end user application. Moreover, it
also increases inefficiency since, as we shall explain soon, the flushing mech-
anism does not need to run after every protected container.
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4.3.4 Smart Scheduling
We need to ensure that (a) the sensitive containers are scheduled on to the
protected cores and (b) the number of flushes is minimized. One way to
to improve the isolation and security for the protected region is to assign
only one core for the protected region. However, this may not be practical
as (i) many cloud workloads are multi-threaded and will do better with
multiple cores and (ii) Intel CAT currently only supports a small number of
L3 partitions (maximum of four for this processor). One fix could be to create
multiple protected regions with one core (and associated LLC partition) each.
To ensure cloud applications get access to enough protected cores threads
belonging to a container could be allowed to execute across multiple protected
regions. As for the issue of number of flushes (in the protected regions), one
trivial method could be to initiate a flush mechanism after every sensitive
container executes. Of course, this could result in a lot of wasted resources
since we do not need to flush the cache if two sensitive containers from the
same organization/tenant execute in a back-to-back fashion. Also, we only
flush the cache partition belonging to the protected region(s). This ensures
that other containers do not pay the performance penalty associated with
having their caches flushed. Reducing the size of the LLC that needs to be
flushed is important as LLC sizes have grown to sizes of over 45MB. Flushing
such a large cache securely would be detrimental to system performance.
4.3.5 Preventing Page Sharing
As previously discussed, the Intel CAT technology alone cannot thwart all
cross-container L3 based attacks. To prevent an adversary container from
getting a hit due to page(s) being in the protected L3 partition of the victim
(CAT allows cross-partition hits but not evictions), we should prevent page
sharing. In fact, only containers from the same organization may be allowed
to share pages and even then only if such containers are all marked for pro-
tection. However, it is common for container frameworks to use layered file
systems that share page caches (e.g., AUFS in Docker). While it would be
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ideal to control this at a finer granularity, in our current design we employ
filesystems that do not use shared page caches (e.g., btrfs, DeviceMapper).
4.4 Cauldron Implementation
Below we outline the details of our implementation.
4.4.1 Protected Regions
In our current implementation, we associate only one core with a protected
region. As shown in Figure 4.1, a machine with an 8-core processor is par-
titioned into 3 protected regions each with one core and their own LLC
allocated with CAT, and one unprotected region with the remaining 5 cores
and a larger partition of LLC. Each protected region is allocated a cache
partition of 2MB. We believe this to be a reasonable choice for cloud ap-
plications [30], and our performance evaluation suggests as much. We will
explore dynamically varying the number and size of protected regions and
the cores associated with them to improve performance of multi-threaded
applications in future work.
4.4.2 Smart Scheduler
In order to ensure Cauldron is easily deployable, we implement all kernel
level scheduler code as a loadable kernel module requiring no changes to the
host kernel. We leverage kernel return probes [12] to hook into the kernel
schedule routine that is called on every context-switch. Once control is passed
to our module, we determine if the container to be scheduled next belongs
to a different organization than the container previously scheduled in this
protected region. If the containers belong to different organizations we flush
the cache, otherwise we immediately return control to the kernel schedule
routine.
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4.4.3 Cache Flushing
Cauldron employs a software-based mechanism to flush the cache allocated
to a secure partition. For each protected region, we allocate a physically
contiguous array equal to the size of the L3 partition allocated to that region.
This is done at the time our kernel module is loaded into the kernel. During
a context-switch involving containers belonging to different organizations, we
read the elements in this array into the cache. This operation flushes every
cache set in the specific protected region. In order to minimize the overhead
of cache flushing we traverse the array in cache line size steps. This insures
that each cache line allocated to the specific protected partition is touched
only once.
4.4.4 Integration with Docker
We use Docker to manage containers in Cauldron framework. The organi-
zation of a given container is configured using the “–parent-cgroup” option
of the Docker run command. If an organization wants a particular container
to run with the protection of Cauldron, then the parent cgroup of that con-
tainer will be used to differentiate it from containers of other organizations
scheduled on protected cores. Implementing the Cauldron framework in a
popular container runtime like Docker, ensures compatibility with existing
software and allows for easier deployment and integration into the larger
container management ecosystem.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION
We evaluate our design and implementation in terms of both effectiveness
(the ability of the system to stop attacks) and in terms of the performance
overhead of running containers on a system using our secure design. We
ran our experiments on a Ubuntu 15.04 operating system on top of a CAT-
enabled 8 core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2618L v3 @ 2.30GHz machine with
16 GB memory and a 20MB (shared) L3 cache. We use Docker v1.91 as the
container runtime.
5.1 Security Evaluation
As discussed previously, Flush+Reload attacks across Cauldron partitions
may still succeed if the attacker and victim share pages as using the clflush
instruction the attacker can flush any of the lines in the shared pages from
the cache hierarchy. Since clflush is not a privileged instruction, trapping
it would incur significant overhead; instead Cauldron focuses on the sources
of shared memory the attack leverages. To defend against Flush+Reload
attacks across Cauldron partitions we used a layered filesystem that does
not support page caching of shared layers. As discussed further in Chap-
ter 6, we intend to expand Cauldron to also partition the page cache along
organization boundaries so that containers belonging to the same organiza-
tion can benefit from memory sharing of base layers. To validate that this
approach prevents Flush+Reload attacks from deducing meaningful in-
formation we launched the Flush+Reload attack from [57] on a victim
running GPG decryption across a Cauldron partition. Figure 5.1a shows
access times observed by the attacker when using AUFS, a layered filesystem
using a page cache, and when using DeviceMapper (Figure 5.1b), a layered
filesystem driver that does not support a page cache. As can be seen in it-
25
(a) Using AUFS
(b) Using DeviceMapper
Figure 5.1: Cache access latency over time for the Flush+Reload attack
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erations 5000 through 12500 and 42500 through 50000 in Figure 5.1a when
using AUFS the attacker observes low access times due to cache hits from
the victim’s LLC partition and will be able to deduce meaningful information
about victim’s computation patterns. However, the attacker will be unable
to derive information when the DeviceMapper storage backend is used as can
be seen by the lack of access time variations in Figure 5.1b.
To validate that Cauldron is able to defend against cross-core Prime-
Probe attacks, we launch the attack from [43] with the attacker and victim
running on different cores in the unprotected partition and then with the
victim running in a separate Cauldron partition. In the attack implementa-
tion, the attacker uses the Prime+Probe technique to monitor the victim’s
access patterns of different cache sets. The attacker then searches the cache
trace for temporal access patterns indicative of the target application. A
high pattern match count on a cache set indicates that the attacker is able
to identify the cache set being used by the target application, in this case
GnuPG version 1.4.13. The attacker can then continue to extract the private
key.
Figure 5.2a shows the pattern match count for the different cache sets when
the attacker and victim run on different cores in the unprotected region. A
high pattern match count for one cache set shows that the attacker is able
to identify the cache set being used by the victim application. Therefore the
attack is successful. On the other hand, minimal pattern matches, shown in
Figure 5.2b indicates that the attack is unsuccessful once we move the victim
to a protected region. This is because it is not possible to prime the LLC
cache of the victim running in a different partition as CAT doesn’t allow
evictions across partitions.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
We have observed promising initial results by running the OpenSSL and Re-
dis Benchmarks using configurations packaged by Phoronix Test Suite [15].
The OpenSSL benchmark tests RSA 4096-bit performance throughput while
the Redis Benchmark tests a variety of operations including getting and set-
ting values, list operations, and a set operation. We ran each benchmark
with 1, 2, 4, and 8 containers assigned to different organizations on the pro-
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(a) With the victim and attacker running in the unprotected region
(b) With the victim and attacker running in different partitions
Figure 5.2: Pattern match count for the Prime+Probe attack
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tected partitions of Cauldron and saw less than 1% overhead for the OpenSSL
benchmark and no more than 16% overhead for the worst case Redis Bench-
mark (8 containers running on only 3 cores, at full load). In future work
we will evaluate this further while investigating features such as dynamic
sizing of the secure region (right now Cauldron statically dedicates 3 cores
to running protected containers).
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE WORK
Preliminary evaluation results indicate that Cauldron meets its design goals
reasonably well but that there is room for improvement. In particular,
Cauldron is effective in thwarting both Flush+Reload andPrime+Probe
attack types, and in protecting against both same-core and cross-core at-
tacks. Cauldron doesn’t require changes to user applications and libraries
and is also easy to deploy requiring changes only to the host environment
and support for Intel CAT technology which is readily available. However,
the current implementation of Cauldron requires the use of a storage back-
end that doesn’t allow libraries to be shared between containers, in order to
defend against cross-partition Flush+Reload attacks. This may increase
the memory footprint of containers in high density environments. A future
direction is to explore mitigation of this overhead by selectively enabling
shared pages.
Cauldron currently only supports protected partitions with single cores.
This is to ensure that Prime+Probe attacks using the LLC cannot be
launched across cores within a protected region. However, an alternative
approach to dealing with such attacks is to employ constrained- or gang-
scheduling to ensure that only containers belonging to the same tenant can
be running on the cores in a given protected region at any given time. Each
approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. The current approach
of limiting each protected region to one core but allowing cloud workloads to
execute across multiple protected regions will lead to smaller LLC availability
and frequent context switches leading to increased cache-flushing overhead.
The alternative approach on the other hand may lead to underutilization
of processor cores due to gang-scheduling. We will explore the trade-offs
between these two approaches in future work.
Another direction for future work is to attempt further reduce cache-
flushes, say, by increasing the minimum runtime (MRT) of processes and
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thereby reducing the total number context switches albeit at the expense
of container response time. Previous works [34, 45, 47] have shown that it
is also possible to optimize the number of cache-flushes by minimizing con-
text switches involving processes belonging to different security levels. Other
interesting directions for future work include dynamically adjusting the L3
cache size and cores associated with Cauldron partitions.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of lightweight commodity computing and the slowing down
of Moore’s law could mean that cloud providers may no longer be able to
scale their hardware resources to match the increased demand from their
clients. Hence, there will be an increased likelihood that computing jobs from
multiple organizations could be co-located on the same physical hardware.
This raises serious security and privacy concerns that we hope to mitigate
by use of the Cauldron framework. Cauldron intends to provide isolation
guarantees to application developers; and it does this without requiring any
changes to the applications themselves.
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